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JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT:
RULES, EDUCATION, AND ENFORCEMENT
Richard A. Dove, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasingly contentious nature of judicial elections and the
current methods of political campaigning have created an inexorable
conflict between some judicial candidates and the codes of conduct
that regulate their campaign activities. A judicial candidate believes
or has been told that, in order to be elected, he or she must make use
of campaign techniques that are viewed as successful in nonjudicial
campaigns. Yet, these techniques may violate judicial codes of con-
duct that impose standards governing judicial campaign activity for
the purpose of promoting the overarching principles of judicial inde-
pendence, impartiality, and integrity. Decisions applying these stan-
dards to allegations of judicial campaign misconduct have decried
the use of "buzzwords" and catch phrases, which have long been
used by nonjudicial candidates, to characterize one's record or that of
an opponent.!
* Director of Legal & Legislative Services, Supreme Court of Ohio. B.A.
Wittenberg University, 1980; J.D. Capital University School of Law, 1983.
This paper was prepared specifically for the Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the
Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute.
1. See h re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Hein, 706 N.E.2d 34
(Ohio 1999) (discussing a candidate's receipt of a public reprimand and
monetary sanctions totaling nearly $6,400 for characterizing his opponent as
"liberal" and "soft on criminals"); In re Judicial Election Campaign Against
Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 1999) (discussing a candidate who was publicly
reprimanded and ordered to pay monetary sanctions of S12,500 for having
committed six separate instances of campaign misconduct, including implying
that she would impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence presented
and mischaracterizing the method by which her opponent was appointed to the
bench).
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While recognizing a state's compelling interest in protecting the
independence, impartiality, and integrity of its judiciary, some courts
have found attempts to regulate judicial campaign conduct to be
overbroad restrictions on a candidate's First Amendment rights to
communicate his or her message to the electorate. Courts have up-
held prohibitions against false statements, while enjoining the en-
forcement of rules that prohibit misleading statements and factual
misrepresentations. In short, while states may have a greater interest
at stake in attempting to regulate judicial campaign conduct, the First
Amendment will afford candidates protection against enforcement of
campaign regulations that are viewed as stifling public debate and
communication with the electorate. Should these decisions evolve
into a widely held majority view in federal and state courts, it ap-
pears questionable whether states will be able to place any meaning-
ful restrictions on campaign speech of judicial candidates beyond
those that generally are applicable to other candidates for political of-
fice.
II. JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT REGULATIONS
Most states in which judges appear on the ballot have adopted
some form of the 1990 version of the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which generally provides that
judges and judicial candidates must refrain from political activity in-
appropriate to judicial office. Specific provisions require candidates
to abstain from engaging in many types of partisan political activity
that are appropriate for other candidates for public office, such as
publicly endorsing or opposing candidates for public office, appear-
ing in advertisements with other candidates for public office, engag-
ing in personal solicitation of campaign funds, and raising funds with
nonjudicial candidates.
Another frequent area of regulation relates to the content of a
candidate's campaign communications, whether those be the candi-
date's speeches, advertisements promoting the candidate, or re-
sponses to questionnaires and other public inquiries.2 Many states
2. For a discussion regarding the propriety of judicial candidates re-
sponding to candidate questionnaires from interest groups, see N.Y. Judicial
Op. 93-99 (N.Y. Advisory Comm'n Judicial Ethics) (Dec. 12, 1993), 1993 WL
838870, and Ala. Judicial Advisory Op. 00-763 (Ala. Judicial Inquiry
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have based their codes of judicial conduct on the following provi-
sions of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits
judicial candidates from making the following types of statements:
" Pledges or promises of conduct in office, other than the faith-
ful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
" Statements that commit or appear to commit the judicial can-
didate with respect to cases or controversies that are likely to
come before the court;
" Knowing misrepresentations of the identity, qualifications,
present position, or other fact of the candidate or an oppo-
nent.3
In addition to these restrictions, some state codes prevent judi-
cial candidates from making a campaign communication that is ei-
ther of the following:
" The communication is false and is made either knowing the
information to be false or with a reckless disregard of whether
the information is false;
" The communication would be deceiving or misleading to a
reasonable person.
4
Provisions similar to these have formed the basis for disciplinary
actions against several candidates for judicial office. Faced with
potential sanctions that can include removal from office or a suspen-
sion or loss of a law license, some judicial candidates have chal-
lenged the enforcement of these provisions as applied to specific
statements, claiming that these restrictions on campaign speech in-
fringe on the candidate's First Amendment rights. While state and
federal courts have arrived at contrary conclusions when faced with
these claims, there appears to be a trend toward invalidating many
restrictions on statements made by judicial candidates and the con-
tent of judicial candidate advertisements. Whether this trend is reas-
suring or disturbing depends upon one's view of a judicial
Comm'n) (Sept. 9, 2000).
3. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i-iii) (Ander-
son 2000).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (2000); OmHO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E)(1) (1999). For a summary of pro-
posed amendments to the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics, see Charles D.
Clausen, The Long and Winding Road: Political and Canpaign Ethics Rules
for Wisconsin Judges, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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candidate's right to unfettered campaign speech versus the public
interest in ensuring the trust and confidence in the fairness of the ju-
diciary. However, these decisions will likely force many jurisdic-
tions to search for new methods of regulating judicial campaigns in
order to protect what has been recognized uniformly as a legitimate
and compelling state interest or treat judicial campaigns in the same
manner as other campaigns for public office.
A. Case Law Prior to 2000
A relatively early case upheld Ohio's former prohibition against
a judicial candidate announcing his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues. In Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio,5 a judicial can-
didate claimed the Ohio prohibition barred him from promoting the
use of mediation in domestic relations cases, criticizing the excessive
use of referees in those proceedings, and generally announcing his
judicial "philosophy" and "platform.",6 The district court found that
the state's interest in ensuring the actual and perceived integrity and
impartiality of judges outweighed any intrusion on the First Amend-
ment rights of judicial candidates.7  A similar conclusion was
reached in Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania8 where a
candidate sought to avoid disciplinary action for stating his views on
several issues including the need to elect "activist" judges, the im-
portance of the right to privacy, supervision of lower court judges,
criminal sentencing and victims' rights, and application of the rea-
sonable doubt standard. 9 In vacating an injunction issued by the dis-
trict court, the circuit court assumed that the phrase "disputed legal
and political issues" would be applied only to issues likely to come
before the candidate and, therefore, constituted a narrowly tailored
restriction designed to serve the state's compelling interest in an im-
partial judiciary.' 0 The Supreme Court of Washington similarly up-
held the censuring of a judge who, during his campaign, identified
himself as a Democrat and stated his intention to be tough on drunk
5. 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984), affd, 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988).
6. Id. at 72.
7. See id. at 75-76.
8. 944 F.2d 137 (3rd Cir. 1991).
9. See id. at 139.
10. See id. at 143.
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driving offenders." t The latter statement was found by the court to
be contradictory to an "impartial performance of the duties of the of-
fice. 12
In contrast to these decisions, two federal courts and the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court invalidated similar prohibitions. In Buckley v.
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,13 an appellate judge running for the
Illinois Supreme Court touted the fact that he had never authored an
opinion reversing a rape conviction, worked to protect the civil rights
of working people, and issued rulings that protect and expand
women's rights. The Seventh Circuit weighed the competing princi-
ples of free speech and judicial impartiality and, unlike the Third
Circuit in Stretton,14 concluded that the regulation, as written,
reached "far beyond speech that could reasonably be interpreted as
committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his im-
partiality should he be successful in the election."' 5 A similar con-
clusion was reached in ACLU of Florida v. Florida Bar,6 which
found that the regulation was not the most narrowly drawn means of
promoting the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the judici-
ary.
17
In 1991, the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed charges against
a judicial candidate who was charged with violating the prohibition
against announcing views on disputed legal and political issues.'
Among the statements included in the complaint were criticism of a
Kentucky Supreme Court ruling in a personal injury case, statements
about statutes that bar felons from carrying handguns, and comments
on the standard of review in workers' compensation cases.19 The
court recognized the compelling state interest behind the regulation
but concluded that it "strictly prohibits dialogue on virtually every
11. See In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (,ash. 1988).
12. Id. at 396.
13. 997 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1993).
14. See id. at228.
15. Id.
16. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
17. See also Beshear v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (discuss-
ing a state enjoined from sanctioning a candidate who promised voters that, if
elected, he would not allow plea bargaining).
18. J.C.J.D. v. R-J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Ky. 1991).
19. Seeid. at956.
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issue that would be of interest to the voting public" and, thus, was
overbroad.2°
Subsequent to this decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court re-
vised its Code of Judicial Conduct to reflect the provision of the
1990 ABA Model Code, which prohibits statements that commit or
appear to commit candidates with respect to cases, controversies, or
issues likely to come before the court.2' In Deters v. Judicial Re-
tirement and Removal Commission,22 which involved a candidate
who ran advertisements claiming to be a "pro-life" candidate, the
court upheld the revised prohibition as a narrowly drawn regulation
protecting the state's interest in a fair and impartial judiciary.23 The
Deters court relied on Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and
Removal Commission,24 which had generally upheld the canon ex-
cept as it applied to a candidate's comments on court administration,
but stated "[t]here is no compelling state interest which justifies lim-
iting a judicial candidate's speech on court administrative issues....
Impartiality is an attribute of the exercise of a court's adjudicatory
power, not its administrative function.,
25
Indiana Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, in his article discuss-
ing the use and misuse of the First Amendment in invalidating judi-
cial campaign ethics provisions, noted that the aforementioned suc-
cess of First Amendment challenges to ethics rules governing
judicial campaign conduct has "prompted doubt about the viability of
rules covering other judicial behavior."26 Several states have fol-
lowed Kentucky's lead and amended their judicial conduct codes in
20. Id.
21. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT Canon 5(A)(d)(ii) (2000).
22. 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
23. Cf N.Y. Advisory Comm'n on Judicial Ethics Op. No. 93-52 (October
28, 1993), 1993 WL 838832 (finding that a judicial candidate may accept en-
dorsement from the Right to Life party); N.Y. Judicial Op. No. 93-99, supra at
note 2 (finding that a judicial candidate may seek and accept endorsements
from the National Women's Political Caucus and Republican Pro Choice
PAC). Although not expressly stated in these opinions, it is presumed that
candidates may advertise the fact that they received these endorsements.
24. 776 F. Supp. 309, 314 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (holding that it was unneces-
sary to void the entire regulations when they can tailor the relief).
25. Id.
26. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judi-
cialEthics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1059 (1996).
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an attempt to more carefully tailor limits on campaign speech."
However, these states have met with mixed success in defending the
revised regulations against First Amendment challenges by judicial
candidates. Decisions striking these more narrow limits on campaign
speech increases the doubt expressed by Chief Justice Shepard in
1996.
B. Recent Decisions
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that its
prohibition against misleading judicial campaign advertisements was
overbroad and amended its canons to prohibit only those campaign
communications that are knowingly or recklessly false.28 The court
reviewed its canon in light of several campaign advertisements dis-
tributed by an appointed, incumbent judge whose election was op-
posed by an administrator-magistrate from the same court.29 In those
advertisements, the judge touted his involvement, as an attorney, in
opposing a redistribution of tax dollars to urban school districts,
criticized the court's disposition of several criminal cases involving a
defendant who later committed multiple rapes and murders, noting
that these dispositions occurred while his opponent was serving as
court administrator, and referenced a former court employee's alle-
gations of sexual harassment against his opponent.30 The candidate
also circulated a flier that included statements describing the incum-
bent as "[o]ne [t]ough [j]udge" and "[t]ough on [d]omestie [violence
and [s]talkers," and stating that he is "tough on criminals who prey
on women" and "won't stand for acts of domestic violence or allow
stalkers to run wild."'"
In reviewing the canon, the court recognized the rationale for the
regulation, including the state's interest in judicial integrity and the
desire to maintain civility in judicial campaigns, as well as its ability
to impose more stringent regulations on judicial campaign conduct.
32
The court nonetheless concluded that the regulation was at odds with
27. See infra Part B.
28. See In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich. 2000).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 34-35.
31. Id. at 33-34.
32. See id. at 39-40.
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the popular election of judges because it discourages meaningful de-
bate regarding judicial qualifications and, therefore, "impedes the
public's ability to influence the direction of the courts through the
electoral process." 33 The court revised the canon to prohibit only
those statements that are knowingly false or that are made with
reckless disregard of their truth and remanded the matter to the Judi-
cial Tenure Commission with instructions to determine whether the
judge's conduct was contrary to the amended canon.
34
Relying heavily on the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
Chmura, a federal court invalidated an identical provision of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. In Weaver v. Bonner,35 the
plaintiff, who was challenging an incumbent Georgia Supreme Court
justice, distributed campaign brochures and television advertisements
that noted his opponent's support for same-sex marriages, character-
ized his opponent's statements as questioning the constitutionality of
laws that prohibit sex with children under the age of fourteen, and
quoted her as referring to the electric chair as "silly." After a special
committee of the Judicial Qualifications Commission found these
advertisements to be "unethical, unfair, false, and intentionally de-
ceptive" and in violation of the prohibition against false and mis-
leading statements, the candidate challenged the constitutionality of
the canon.3 6 The district court found that the ban on misleading
statements "chills debate by requiring candidates to attempt to de-
termine whether a reasonable person would view their speech as
fraudulent, misleading, or somehow deceptive. It therefore has a
great likelihood of forcing candidates to remain silent on question-
able matters instead of risking adverse action." 37 The court tacitly
recognized the state's ability to prohibit false statements but declined
to revise the canon to bring it within the First Amendment.
38
Chmura was cited extensively in another federal court action
that resulted in the issuance of a temporary injunction against the
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, pending a full hearing of the
33. Id. at 42-43.
34. See id. at 45.
35. 114 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
36. See id. at 1340.




matter in early 2001. 39 Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commis-
sion involved a primary campaign for chief justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court between a sitting justice and a trial court judge.
40
During the campaign, the justice ran campaign advertisements in
which he criticized his opponent, who was a sitting judge, for his re-
cord of sentencing in drug cases.4' In temporarily enjoining en-
forcement of a provision of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics
that prohibits the knowing or reckless distribution of false informa-
tion and the distribution of true information that would be misleading
or deceiving to a reasonable person, the court stated:
[T]he "deceiving or misleading" portion of Canon 7B(2)
does not allow for erroneous but unintentional or innocent
statements. As a result, it has the potential to squelch free
speech by inhibiting candidates from speaking for fear of
violating the canon and being disciplined. Without an in-
tent element or falsity requirement, candidates risk violating
the canon for mistaken but innocent dissemination of "de-
ceiving or misleading" information. Thus, rather than risk
violating the canon, the candidate may choose to remain
silent rather than exercise his or her freedom of speech.42
Contrary to this line of cases, a portion of the Nevada Code of
Judicial Conduct, which prohibits the knowing misrepresentation of
facts concerning the candidate or an opponent, has withstood consti-
tutional challenge. 43 The federal district court in Maihan v. Judicial
Ethics and Election Practices Commission44 held that this prohibition
was neither vague nor overbroad in that it gives clear notice to can-
didates of the type of speech that is prohibited and does not chill po-
litical speech since false statements are not protected by the First
Amendment.45 The court did strike as vague the general provision of
39. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233-35
(M.D. Ala. 2000).
40. See id. at 1226-27.
41. See id. at 1224.
42. Id. at 1235.
43. See NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (1999).
44. CV-S-98-01663-DAE (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2000).
45. See Court Upholds Prohibition on Misrepresentations in Campaigns,
Overturns Provision on Maintaining Dignity, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER,
Spring 2000.
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the canons that require judicial candidates to "maintain the dignity
appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent with the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.
'A6
III. EFFORTS TO EDUCATE CANDIDATES AND THE PUBLIC
Meaningful judicial election reform efforts must include com-
ponents of education and enforcement. If candidates and the public
are not familiar with the rules, they will be unable to comprehend
and follow them. If the rules are not enforced, or if enforcement ef-
forts are delayed or ineffectual, candidates may be less inclined to
obey them. As a result, the public may lose confidence in the elec-
toral, and perhaps the judicial, process.
Several jurisdictions have deemed it worthwhile to educate can-
didates and the public about the unique nature of judicial elections.
For example, as part of its 1995 rewrite of the canon pertaining to ju-
dicial campaign conduct, the Supreme Court of Ohio included a pro-
vision that requires all judicial candidates to complete a two-hour
course on campaign conduct and finance.47 This course, which must
be completed no later than thirty days after being certified as a can-
didate, addresses conduct and campaign finance rules unique to judi-
cial campaigns and statutory campaign finance reporting require-
ments applicable to all candidates for public office. Attendees
receive a handbook containing the judicial conduct rules, advisory
opinions and court decisions interpreting those rules, and materials
detailing statutory campaign finance reporting requirements. Judicial
candidates are encouraged to bring campaign committee members
and other volunteers with them to the seminars as a means of edu-
cating persons who have positions of responsibility and accountabil-
ity in the campaign.48 Attendees at past seminars have included state
46. Id. Compare this holding with the unpublished opinion of Harper v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 113 F.3d 1234 (6th Cir. 1997), wherein the
court declined to strike a similar provision of the Ohio Code of Judicial Con-
duct because Ohio judicial candidates, through advisory opinions and case law,
are provided with guidance regarding appropriate campaign conduct.
47. See OHIO REv. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT ANN. Canon 7(B)(5) (Supp.
1999).
48. See OHIO REV. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT ANN. Canon 7(F) (Supp.
1999) (holding a judicial candidate responsible for the conduct of his or her
campaign committee, including compliance with provisions relative to cam-
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and county political party staff, including the state chairmen of the
Republican and Democratic parties, members of local judicial
monitoring committees, and members and staff of county boards of
election with which local judicial candidates must file campaign fi-
nance reports.
Similarly, the Washington State Judicial Ethics Committee
hosted two campaign forums in 2000 for judicial candidates and
members of their campaign committees.49 While candidates were
not required to attend these forums, they provided candidates and
others involved in judicial campaigns with an opportunity to learn
more about the applicable rules of conduct.
States also have established telephone contacts to address ques-
tions that arise during the campaign. In Ohio, the staff of the su-
preme court and the court's Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline are available to respond to questions from candidates,
the public, and the media regarding judicial campaign conduct.50 A
similar hotline was established by the State Bar of Michigan in 1998
and received more than 100 calls from judicial candidates seeking
guidance about campaign conduct.51 While it requires staff time to
respond to these inquiries, the time can be well spent if a prompt re-
sponse steers a candidate away from conduct that is contrary to judi-
cial campaign regulations and could result in more time-consuming
and costly grievance proceedings.
Education efforts do not stop with candidates. Members of the
public, who cast ballots for judicial candidates need to better com-
prehend the differences between judicial elections and other elections
for public office. Often, the public does not understand why a judi-
cial candidate cannot express views on issues of general public con-
cern ranging from the merits of the death penalty to a local zoning
issue. To address this knowledge gap, several states, including
paign communications and finance).
49. See Judicial Campaign Forums, Wash. State Bar Assoc., at
http'//www.wsba.orglbamews/2000/05/forum.htm (ast visited Apr. 1, 2001).
50. See Judicial Candidate Information, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances
and Discipline, at http://vv.sconet.state.oh.us/Judicial Candidates/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2001).
51. See Thomas K Byerley, Focus on Professional Responsibility: Judicial
Campaign Ethics Experiment, 78 MICH. B.J. 318, 319 (1999).
June 2001] 1457
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:1447
Michigan, Florida, Ohio, and Washington, provide voter pamphlets
or information guides to registered voters.
Voter education efforts are not unique to courts or their affili-
ated agencies. The Citizens for Independent Courts, a national or-
ganization that promotes judicial independence and greater public
understanding of the courts, has developed "Higher Ground" stan-
dards that primarily are intended to provide voters with information
about ethics rules that govern judicial campaigns. 52 While these
standards do not differ substantively from the rules that already are
applicable to judicial candidates in most states, they also are used as
a means of further encouraging judicial candidates to conduct their
campaigns in a manner that advances the independence and dignity
of the judiciary. The "Higher Ground" standards have been endorsed
by organizations in states that are experiencing contentious elections
in 2000, including Common Cause and the League of Women Voters
in Alabama53 and the state bar association, Common Cause, League
of Women Voters, and the Council of Churches in Ohio.
54
IV. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH CAMPAIGN CONDUCT RULES
Any standards of conduct that are more than aspirational in na-
ture must be accompanied by procedures to resolve alleged viola-
tions and, if necessary, impose appropriate sanctions on offending
candidates. For many years, states have had procedures in place to
address complaints of judicial misconduct, including those that arise
during campaigns. However, just as our judicial system has devel-
oped methods of resolving legal disputes as alternatives to litigation,
several jurisdictions have established informal procedures for decid-
ing campaign disputes. Whether these procedures consist of infor-
mational hotlines, advisory opinions, or voluntary campaign over-
sight committees, they can provide faster and more satisfactory
52. See The Higher Ground Standards of Conduct for Judicial Candidates,
The Constitution Project, at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/
standards.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
53. See Alabama Groups Push Higher Standards for Court Campaigns,
The Constitution Project, at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/
pressreleasesalstandards.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
54. See Ohio Groups Push Higher Standards for Court Campaigns, The
Constitution Project, at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ci/
pressreleasesohstandards.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
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means of addressing claims of inappropriate behavior. Moreover,
while informal efforts may not allow for imposition of sanctions that
directly affect a judge's tenure or a lawyer's ability to practice law,
they can be effective in deterring or halting inappropriate campaign
conduct.
A. Georgia
By rule, the Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission has
established a three member Special Committee on Judicial Election
Campaign Intervention. The stated objective of that committee is to
"alleviate unethical and unfair campaign practices," and the com-
mittee is given the power to "deal expeditiously with allegations of
ethical misconduct in campaigns for judicial office." 55 The rule es-
tablishes an "informal and nonadversarial" means of addressing alle-
gations of judicial campaign misconduct and provides that all com-
plaints must be acted on within ten days.56 Rule 27 was challenged
on due process grounds in Weaver.5 7 However, the court concluded
that the rule "sufficiently balance[s] the state's interest in expedi-
tiously resolving [campaign conduct] issues against a candidate's
interest in being heard" and that "further procedural safeguards
would be overly burdensome and unrealistic."
5
B. Michigan
In response to concerns that judicial campaign complaints were
not expeditiously addressed and often were dismissed following the
election, the Michigan Bar implemented a Judicial Election Cam-
paign Conduct program in 1998. The program, which was voluntary
in nature, required participating candidates to sign a pledge of clean
campaign conduct that bound the candidate and others worldng un-
der the candidate's direction and control.5 9 Multiple judicial election
panels were established throughout Michigan to hear and resolve,
within forty-eight hours, complaints of inappropriate campaign con-
duct. Approximately seventy percent of the candidates in contested
55. GA. JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMM'N RULE 27 (2000).
56. See id.
57. See Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
58. Id. at 1346.
59. See Byerley, supra note 51, at 318-19.
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trial court cases agreed to participate in the program, and the panels
reviewed six formal complaints, all of which either were dismissed
or resolved. 60  The program was considered successful in
"heighten[ing] all candidates' awareness of ethical considerations for
judicial campaigns." 61 Notwithstanding this perceived success, the
program was not renewed for the 2000 election.
C. Alabama
Other states have engaged in similar monitoring activities for the
purposes of enhancing candidate and public awareness of judicial
campaign conduct requirements and promoting the integrity of judi-
cial campaigns. The Supreme Court of Alabama appointed a twelve-
member Judicial Campaign Oversight Committee for the 1998 elec-
tion, and the committee engaged in candidate and voter education ef-
forts and received more than 350 inquiries regarding judicial cam-
paign conduct.62 The initial oversight committee was "instrumental
in improving the overall tone of judicial campaigns in Alabama," and
a successor committee was reappointed for the 2000 election.
63
D. Ohio
Judicial election oversight committees can also be created on a
local basis. For the past several elections, voluntary judicial election
monitoring committees have been established by bar associations in
Ohio's two largest counties-Cuyahoga (Cleveland) and Franklin
(Columbus). Since 1987, the Franklin County committee, has al-
lowed candidates to enter into voluntary campaign conduct
60. See id. at 319.
61. Id.
62. ABA Task Force Recognizes Alabama Judicial Campaign Oversight
Committee, ALA. CT. NEWS, Sept. 1998, at http://www.alalinc.net/aoc/pub_
info/Ct_news.htm (last visited Oct. 2000).
63. ALA. CT. NEWS, Aug. 1999, at http://www.alalinc.net/aoc/pubinfo/
CT news.htm (last visited Oct. 2000). For additional information regarding
similar informal campaign monitoring efforts in Georgia, South Dakota, Okla-
homa, and Nevada, see Earle B. May Jr., Georgia Adopts New Rules Govern-
ing Political Conduct, JuD. CONDuCT REP., Summer-Fall 1997, available at
Westlaw, JCR Database; South Dakota Adopts Procedures for Handling Judi-
cial Campaign Complaints, JUD. CoNDUCT. REP., Winter-Spring 1998, avail-




agreements while providing a method for resolving disputes over the
content of advertisements and other forms of campaign conduct. In
addition to considering complaints filed by candidates, the commit-
tee prescreens print and electronic campaign advertisements and
contacts candidates whose materials appear to violate either the Code
of Judicial Conduct or the voluntary agreement. The committee dis-
cusses the matter with the candidate or representatives of his or her
campaign, and in a majority of instances, secures an agreement from
the candidate to alter advertisements or campaign conduct. Where
no agreement can be reached, the committee has the authority to
publicize the noncompliance in the local media and can refer the
matter to the disciplinary counsel or elections commission for formal
review. According to the current committee chair, judicial candi-
dates in the last four elections have abided by the committee's de-
terminations. The committee has not found it necessary to issue me-
dia releases or refer complaints for formal action.
When the Supreme Court of Ohio revised its judicial campaign
conduct rules in 1995, the court recognized that these local volunteer
committees could serve as effective alternatives to the formal disci-
plinary process. The rules governing consideration of judicial cam-
paign grievances allow campaign complaints between candidates
who voluntarily have signed an agreement with a monitoring com-
mittee to be referred to that committee for resolution.r In the elec-
tions since the committees have been established, a period involving
more than 100 separate judicial campaigns, only one formal cam-
paign complaint has arisen from these counties.
65
E. New York
Monroe County (Rochester), New York established a similar bar
committee for the 2000 election as a result of "the tone and conduct
of several recent judicial campaigns." 66 The resolution creating the
Judicial Campaign Practices Committee establishes a process by
64. See OHIO GOv. JUD. R. II § 5(C)(2).
65. This information is based on the author's personal knowledge having
served as staff attorney to the judicial commissions that have been appointed
since 1995.
66. Letter from Monroe County Bar Association President to New York
Justice Albert M. Rosenblatt (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
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which candidates who sign a voluntary campaign pledge may have
campaign conduct disputes mediated by the committee. If the me-
diation process does not resolve the dispute and the committee be-
lieves the conduct violates the Code of Judicial Conduct or impacts
negatively on the public trust and confidence in the judiciary, the bar
association's board of trustees may issue a news release about the
complaint.
67
Informal monitoring efforts are most successful when perceived
by candidates and the public as a fair and effective alternative to
formal oversight bodies. The likelihood of success is enhanced if the
entity engaged in the monitoring is nonpartisan or bipartisan and
consists of a diverse group of responsible and well-respected com-
munity leaders, including persons outside the legal profession.
F. Formal Enforcement of Judicial Campaign Regulations
Formal processes to address allegations of judicial campaign
misconduct must have two key components in order to be effective.
First, the rules must apply to all judicial candidates, regardless of
whether a candidate is a sitting judge or an attorney, and provide for
disciplinary proceedings extending beyond election day. A defeated
candidate should not be able to escape punishment for campaign
misconduct solely because the candidate did not win the election.
Moreover, because inappropriate campaign conduct may diminish
the public's confidence in the judiciary, campaign violations should
not be ignored or dismissed simply because the election is over or
because the alleged misconduct is perceived to have had no impact
on the outcome.
Second, the procedures for addressing judicial campaign com-
plaints should take into account the dynamic nature of the campaign
process. Like other political campaigns, judicial elections are most
vigorously contested during the weeks immediately preceding elec-
tion day, and it is during this time that campaign conduct complaints
are most likely to arise. A grievance process must allow for a
prompt, yet fair, consideration of those complaints. Regardless of
whether allegations of misconduct are found to have merit, the
67. See Resolution of the Monroe County, N.Y. BAR ASS'N, June 20, 2000
(on file with author).
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electorate should be aware of the resolution of the complaint, if at all
possible, before going to the polls.
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed these components in
drafting new rules for the expedited consideration of campaign com-
plaints. First, the court amended the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility to add DR 1-102(A)(1), which subjects an attorney to discipli-
nary action if, while a judicial candidate, the attorney violated any
provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct that applies to judicial
candidates. 68  This amendment closed a loophole that arguably
barred post election grievance proceedings against an unsuccessful
candidate who no longer was subject to the Code of Judicial Con-
duct.
Second, the court included in its rules governing judicial disci-
pline procedures expedited procedures for reviewing and resolving
judicial campaign complaints.69 The expedited procedures allow a
maximum of twenty days to elapse from the time a campaign com-
plaint is filed until an initial detennination is made by a complaint
hearing panel. This timeline can be extended for any one of five rea-
sons, including due process considerations or the complexity of the
issues presented in the complaint.70 While the hearing panel does not
have final authority to determine a violation or impose sanctions
against a judicial candidate, the panel's findings and recommenda-
tions carry great weight and will, in most cases, bring a halt to the
improper conduct. These procedures do not allow for the resolution
of every campaign grievance prior to the election since many viola-
tions occur or come to light only a few days in advance of election
day. However, the process for expediting campaign grievances has
afforded a hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline to issue a preelection finding and recommenda-
tion in several key cases. Moreover, once the hearing panel issues its
report, a judicial commission appointed by the supreme court has the
authority to enter an interim cease and desist order, based on the
hearing panel's report, pending further review of the matter.
68. See OHIO C.P.R. Canon 1 (Anderson 2000).
69. See OHIO Gov. JUD. R. II § 5(C)(2) (Anderson 2000).
70. See id. at § 5(K).
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An important element of the expedited procedure is the avail-
ability of judges, attorneys, and lay people to hear the complaints.
Probable cause and hearing panels appointed by the Board of Com-
missioners consist primarily of current members of the board. Be-
cause of the expedited nature of these complaints and the regular
slate of disciplinary cases assigned to board members, the board is
authorized to appoint former board members to serve on these pan-
els.71 The supreme court appoints the five member judicial commis-
sions from a list of approximately twenty-five judges who have
agreed, in advance, to accept such an appointment. Judges are asked
to serve on no more than two commissions and may decline an ap-
pointment for any reason. While the judicial commissions have
authority to conduct hearings, they have routinely conducted their
independent review of the hearing panel's report by considering the
record made before the board and briefs filed by the parties. The
process is expedited through the use of express mail and electronic
transmission of documents to and from commission members and
telephone conferences to conduct deliberations.
Ohio's expedited procedure has significantly reduced the time
necessary to resolve campaign grievances. Since 1995, two cases in-
volving allegations of campaign misconduct have proceeded through
the normal disciplinary process and were not resolved until more
than two years had elapsed since the alleged misconduct occurred.
By contrast, the eleven actions that have been heard through the ex-
pedited process have reached final resolution approximately two to
five months after the misconduct occurred. In seven of these eleven
cases, either a preliminary finding or a final order was issued prior to
the election.
72
71. See id. § 5(C)(1)(c).
72. For more information about Ohio's expedited campaign grievance pro-
cess and enforcement of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct through the 1998
election, see Jennifer Brunner, Separation of Power as a Basis for Restraint on
a Free Speaking Judiciary and the Implementation of Canon 7 of the Code of




G. Sanctions for Campaign Misconduct
Sanctions against candidates who have violated judicial cam-
paign conduct regulations serve a dual purpose of punishing the of-
fender and informing the legal community of the standards of appro-
priate judicial campaign conduct.73 While these sanctions may do
little to lessen the damage caused by false or misleading statements,
the expedited and public nature of the complaint process and the at-
tentiveness of the media to campaign violations can ensure that the
public is made aware of the offense. Commissions that review judi-
cial campaign conduct violations in Ohio have available a range of
sanctions that include fines, cease and desist orders, suspension of a
law license, and suspension or removal from office.74 In addition,
the judicial commissions charged with reviewing can be creative in
their imposition of punishment. One commission required an of-
fending candidate to apologize publicly to his opponent and to the
citizens of his judicial district.75 When the candidate submitted the
apology for review, the commission found it to be an attempt to jus-
tify his actions rather than a true expression of remorse. The com-
mission rewrote the proposed apology and ordered the candidate to
publish the revised version.
76
V. CONCLUSION
Courts called upon to review judicial campaign conduct regula-
tions have given passing deference to Justice Stewart's statement that
"[t]here could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's
interest in the quality of its judiciary" 77 while ultimately concluding
that this interest does not justify the imposition of regulations that in-
fringe on the candidate's First Amendment rights. These decisions
have severely limited the ability of many states to regulate the
73. See In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Morris, 675 N.E.2d 580
(Ohio 1997).
74. See OHIO Gov. JUD. P. II § 5(E)(1)(a)-(e).
75. See In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Hildebrandt, 675
N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ohio 1997).
76. See In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Hildebrandt, 680
N.E.2d 631, 631 (Ohio 1997).
77. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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conduct of their judicial candidates and arguably allow the imposi-
tion of few restrictions beyond those commonly placed on candidates
for nonjudicial office. We are faced with the distinct prospect, in the
not too distant future, of seeing judicial campaigns that are indistin-
guishable from those conducted by legislative and executive branch
candidates, replete with misleading "buzzwords" and labels, implied,
if not express, promises of conduct in office, and negative cam-
paigning. Indeed, some feel as though this day is already here. As
stated by one trial judge who invalidated a portion of Georgia's judi-
cial campaign rules:
Abuses are no longer potential or theoretical; they have ar-
rived. The people of Georgia have chosen to elect their
judges. That decision, like all decisions, has consequences,
one of which is that contested elections, with all their bag-
gage, will occur.78
This prospect carries very significant, and potentially adverse
ramifications for the independence and integrity of the judiciary in
those states in which judicial candidates appear on the ballot. Short
of abandoning the popular election of judges, these states must ex-
plore new means to regulate judicial campaign conduct that fall
within the confines of the First Amendment. While these attempts
are underway, judges, judicial candidates, and persons in positions of
influence and authority can continue to engage in and promote ac-
tivities designed to further dignify judicial campaign conduct. Ef-
forts to educate candidates and the public on the rationale for legiti-
mate limitations on judicial campaign activities and the need for
judicial candidates to observe higher standards of conduct will help
sustain judicial independence and integrity. Informal monitoring
committees can encourage candidates to engage in legitimate, yet re-
spectful, debate about qualifications, court administration, general
judicial philosophy, and provide a forum for addressing disagree-
ments that arise during the campaign. Formal enforcement efforts
that allow for a prompt and fair resolution of campaign complaints
can serve to compel compliance with permissible campaign regula-
tions and impose meaningful sanctions against candidates who run
afoul of the rules.
78. Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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